“Power-sharing can stop wars, but it cannot build strong states if it becomes a permanent substitute for accountable institutions and shared citizenship.” -Ali Halane
Power-sharing arrangements are often introduced as safeguards against conflict. They promise inclusion, balance, and protection from renewed authoritarianism. In both Iraq and Somalia, such systems were adopted under extraordinary circumstances—one after foreign-led regime change, the other following total state collapse.
Yet in both cases, what began as a stabilizing mechanism has hardened into a political structure that perpetuates fragility rather than resolves it.
Iraq’s post-2003 order was built on a sectarian and ethnic power-sharing formula designed to ensure representation for Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds. Somalia, emerging from decades of civil war, institutionalized the 4.5 clan-based model to distribute parliamentary seats and executive power among major clans and minority groups.
Both systems were conceived as temporary bridges toward more stable democratic governance. Instead, they evolved into entrenched frameworks that define political competition through identity rather than policy.
At the core of both systems lies the formalization of communal entitlement. Political office is not simply contested; it is allocated. In Iraq, key leadership positions follow an unwritten but widely accepted sectarian distribution. In Somalia, the 4.5 formula remains the primary basis for political representation despite repeated promises of reform.
In neither case has identity-based allocation faded with time. Rather, it has become institutionalized, shaping electoral behavior, coalition formation, and governance outcomes.
This structure produces governments that are broad in composition but narrow in cohesion. Iraq’s successive national unity governments often emerge only after prolonged negotiations, reflecting elite bargains rather than clear electoral mandates.
Somalia’s federal administrations depend on delicate alignments with regional leaders and clan elites, where political survival frequently hinges on managing rivalries rather than advancing coherent policy agendas. The result in both countries is a state that functions, but without strategic direction or deep public trust.
Federalism has compounded the complexity. In Iraq, tensions between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government over oil revenues and constitutional competencies have become recurring flashpoints.
In Somalia, disputes between the federal government and member states regularly escalate over elections, security coordination, and resource control. Federalism was meant to distribute power and reduce concentration; instead, it often serves as an additional arena for political contestation.
Executive authority, meanwhile, tends to become personalized. In Iraq, the prime minister’s office holds significant constitutional powers, making it the focal point of intense political competition.
In Somalia, the presidency is central to executive control and security policy, concentrating influence in ways that heighten political stakes. When power-sharing systems revolve around key offices with expansive authority, competition intensifies and consensus weakens.